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Abstract 
Theory of mind, the cognitive capacity to infer others’ mental states, is crucial for the 
development of social communication. The impairment of theory of mind may relate to 
autism spectrum disorder (ASD), which is characterised by profound difficulties in social 
interaction and communication. In the current article, I summarize recent updates in theory of 
mind research utilizing the spontaneous false belief test, which assesses participants’ 
spontaneous tendency to attribute belief status to others. These studies reveal that young 
infants pass the spontaneous false belief test well before they can pass the same task when 
explicitly asked to answer. By contrast, high-functioning adults with ASD, who can easily 
pass the false belief task when explicitly asked to, do not show spontaneous false belief 
attribution. These findings suggest that the capacity for theory of mind develops much earlier 
than was previously thought, and the absence of spontaneous theory of mind may relate to 
impairment in social interaction and communication found in ASD. 
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Spontaneous theory of mind and its absence in autism spectrum 
disorders 
 
Imagine the following situation. You happened to come home earlier than usual. You were 
very hungry, and remembered that your partner keeps her (or his) precious chocolate in the 
cupboard, which she only eats after unusually hard day’s work as a special treat. You know 
how important the chocolate is to her, but you were so hungry that you took the whole box 
out of the cupboard and ate about half of it. When she suddenly arrived home, you just had 
time to put the box under the coffee table before she came in to the living room. She then said 
that “I’ve had a really hectic day - I’m exhausted! I think I deserve some chocolate tonight.” 
What would you do?  
Most of you would predict that she would get to the cupboard (so you have to do 
something quickly, before she opens it.). At the same time, you may not realize what a 
complex and sophisticated reasoning you’ve just made to generate this prediction, as it would 
have occurred to you naturally and effortlessly. The reasoning you have just made could be 
broken down into understanding that she will open the cupboard because (1) she wants the 
chocolate and (2) she believes that it is still in the cupboard because (3) she doesn’t know that 
you’ve moved it. Such reasoning is called the theory of mind. It involves inferring others’ 
behaviour based on their mental states, which are opaque and impossible to observe directly. 
Since the concept of theory of mind was first introduced (Premack and Woodruff, 1978), it 
has been central to investigations within various fields of cognitive science, including 
developmental psychology, comparative psychology, cognitive neuroscience and child 
psychiatry. Theory of mind is essential for human social interaction and communication, and 
also plays a significant role in human cooperation and moral reasoning (e.g. Waytz, Gray, 
Epley, and Wegner, 2010). Thus, theory of mind is a cornerstone of human adaptation to 
complex and effective social institutions. 
In the above example, the prediction of the behaviour is based on her false belief, 
because the belief (i.e., the chocolate is still in the cupboard) is counterfactual, or 
incongruent to the current state of the world (i.e., the chocolate is actually under the coffee 
table). Attribution of false belief is the hallmark of theory of mind, because it generates 
unique predictions of others’ behaviour which are impossible solely from the actual states of 
the world (Dennett, 1978). Thus, many psychologists have treated false belief understanding 
as “the litmus paper” of theory of mind, and used the so-called false belief test to assess the 
capacity for theory of mind at various ages and at various psychiatric and/or 
neuropsychological conditions. In a standard false belief test, an experimenter presents an 
event in which an object is moved during the absence of a protagonist, and then asks the 
participant where the protagonist will look for the object. Participants pass the test if they 
correctly answer that the protagonist will look for the original location of the object, and fail 
if they choose the current location of the object.  
In a landmark study, Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985) reported that children with 
autism, who suffer from severe impairment in social interaction and communication, do not 
pass the false belief test. This seminal study inspired many follow-up studies, both in 
typically developing children and children with autism spectrum disorders (ASD). The 
accumulation of the studies supports the proposal that children with ASD show atypical 
development of the capacity for theory of mind. The most consistent finding is that before the 
verbal mental age of 11 years, children with ASD do not pass various versions of the false 
belief test. Whereas typical 4-year-olds correctly anticipate others’ behaviour based on the 
attribution of false belief, children with ASD, at the same mental age or even higher, 
incorrectly predict behaviour based on reality without taking the other person’s epistemic 
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states (e.g. knowledge and belief) into account (Happé, 1995, Figure 1). This result has been 
interpreted as evidence that children with ASD (with verbal skills equivalent to typically 
developing children of under 11 years) fail to represent others’ epistemic mental states, or at 
least fail to do so when others’ mental states are different from the child’s own. Based on 
these findings, some scientists suggested that the difficulty in social interaction and 
communication in ASD derives from impairment in theory of mind (Mindblindness theory, 
Baron-Cohen, 1995). 
However, there are two major problems in the standard false belief test. Firstly, it is a 
cognitively demanding test. To pass the test, a child has to remember the sequence of the 
presented event, correctly understand the experimenter’s question, and inhibit their prepotent 
response to answer the actual location of object (Birch and Bloom, 2003). Thus, it is possible 
that despite having the capacity to represent another person’s mental state, children fail the 
standard false belief test because of a weaker cognitive control or difficulty in pragmatic 
understanding. Secondly, as can be seen from Figure 1, individuals with ASD with higher 
verbal skills do pass the standard false belief test.  
However, the qualitative difficulties in social interaction and communication persist 
even in these “high-functioning” individuals with ASD. For example, in an experimental 
setting, they still show subtle difficulties in understanding non-literal utterance (Happé, 1994) 
and faux-pas (Baron-Cohen, O'Riordan, Stone, Jones, and Plaisted, 1999), and fail to 
correctly infer complex mental states from photographs of eyes (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, 
Mortimore, and Robertson, 1997) and from cartoon animations (Castelli, Frith, Happé, and 
Frith, 2002). The capacity to correctly represent another person’s false belief may not be 
sufficient for a fully-functional theory of mind, which works in various contexts.  
 
Young infants spontaneously attribute false belief to others 
Infant scientists have revealed that infants have amazing cognitive skills well before 
they begin to walk or speak. For example, even newborns discriminate faces from non-facial 
objects, and differentiate the direction of eye gaze of faces. Within the first year of life, 
infants show a rudimentary understanding of physical principles such as rigidity and gravity, 
as well as an understanding of others’ minds in terms of concepts such as goals and 
perception (e.g. Spelke and Kinzler, 2007).  
As infants cannot answer verbal questions, infant scientists rely on infants’ spontaneous 
responses to carefully controlled stimuli to assess these capabilities. The majority of studies 
make inferences about infants’ cognitive operation from the pattern of their looking 
behaviour. Preferential looking techniques, for example, involve presenting two stimuli 
side-by-side, to see if the infant prefers looking at one over the other. A preference suggests 
that infants can discriminate between the two stimuli. More recently, infant scientists have 
begun to use eye-tracking devices, which allow them to record exactly which area of the 
stimuli infants are watching.  
In the last 5 years, such studies of infants’ spontaneous behaviour have revealed that 
children pass a false belief test well before the age of 3. Take one of our previous studies 
using eye-tracking techniques, for example (Southgate, Senju, and Csibra, 2007, Figure 2). In 
this study, infants initially watched familiarization movies, in which a puppet hid a toy in one 
of two boxes (Figure 2A). Then, both windows were briefly illuminated and a chime sounded 
(Figure 2B). About 2 seconds after the illumination and the chime, the actor would open one 
of the two windows, reach out of it and take the toy (Figure 2C). After a few trials, infants 
would learn the contingency between the cues (i.e. the illumination and the chime) and the 
actor’s subsequent action, anticipate the action after the cues, and fixate on the correct 
window (i.e. the window closer to the box in which the toy was hidden) before the actor 
opened the window. Once this anticipatory look was established, we then presented a false 
4 
belief movie, in which the puppet took the toy from the box and disappeared while the actor 
was looking away from the stage (Figure 2D). When the actor turned back, the cues were 
presented. In this experiment, the anticipatory looking of 24-month-old infants showed that 
they anticipated that the actor would reach for the box in which she had last seen that the toy 
was hidden. The results clearly demonstrated that these infants attributed false belief to the 
actor, and predicted the actor’s behaviour based on her belief, not the actual state of the 
world. 
To date, a number of studies, including ours described above, have demonstrated that 
typically developing infants pass a spontaneous false belief test within the second year of life. 
The majority of these studies measured infants’ spontaneous behaviour such as looking time 
or eye-tracking (Baillargeon, Scott, and He, 2010). Others used more active interaction with 
the experimenter such as word learning (Southgate, Chevallier, and Csibra, 2010) or helping 
behaviour (Buttelmann, Carpenter, and Tomasello, 2009).  
These findings confirm the claim that the standard explicit false belief test is hampered 
by high cognitive and verbal demands, which preclude us from revealing the capacity for 
false belief attribution in younger infants. It is not clear why young infants have difficulty in 
standard false belief tests, but some scientists argue that it could be due to immature 
pragmatic skills. For example it is possible that younger infants might prematurely interpret 
the “Where” question as referring to the actual location of the object (Csibra and Southgate, 
2006). Others argue that the main difficulty is in selecting an appropriate answer from other, 
possibly more salient, alternatives such as the actual location of the object (Baillargeon and 
others., 2010). Note that these possibilities are not mutually exclusive, and further studies 
will be required to understand the developmental course of spontaneous and explicit false 
belief attributions. 
 
Absence of spontaneous false belief attribution in individuals with ASD 
Spontaneous theory of mind is critical not only for infants, but also for adults. Unlike 
experiments, the real social world is fluid and rapidly changing. We have to process socially 
relevant information rapidly, spontaneously and on-line, in order to achieve day-to-day social 
interaction. Let’s return to the hypothetical social situation described at the beginning of this 
article. To achieve good social interaction with your partner, you have to detect all the 
relevant information (e.g. her facial expression, gaze and utterances), predict her behaviour 
(e.g. looking for the chocolate in the cupboard), and act quickly. All these cognitive 
operations need to be conducted spontaneously, as in daily social interaction it is highly 
unlikely that you will be offered explicit information about another person’s mental state. For 
example, you wouldn’t expect your partner to ask “Where do you think I will look for the 
chocolate?”. Thus the absence of spontaneous theory of mind would cause difficulty in social 
interaction and communication, even in adults with high verbal and cognitive skills.  
We hypothesized that individuals with high-functioning autism spectrum disorder, even 
though they can easily pass standard false belief tests (Figure 1), do not pass the spontaneous 
false belief test. To test this hypothesis, we used the same experiment as with 2-year-old 
infants on adults with Asperger Syndrome. Asperger Syndrome is a sub-category of ASD, 
with similar symptoms but no developmental delay in verbal skills (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000). In our experiment (Senju, Southgate, White, and Frith, 2009), 19 adults 
with Asperger Syndrome watched the video stimuli we used in Southgate and others (2007), 
and their eye movements were recorded with an eye-tracker. No instruction was given to the 
participants. For comparison with typical development, we also recruited 17 neurotypical 
adults with similar age, gender ratio and general cognitive skills. All participants in both 
groups passed standard false belief tests. All participants also showed anticipatory looking by 
the end of familiarization trials, suggesting that adults with Asperger Syndrome, as well as 
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neurotypical adults, spontaneously anticipate another person’s action based on her goal.  
However, the test trials showed a very different picture. The Asperger group showed 
significantly less anticipatory looking toward the correct side than the neurotypical controls 
did. A follow-up analysis revealed that the anticipatory looking of neurotypical controls were 
significantly biased to the correct location. This is not the case for Asperger group, whose 
anticipatory looking behaviour was not biased to either side (Figure 3).  
Our study demonstrates that adults with Asperger syndrome do not spontaneously 
anticipate others’ actions in a nonverbal task, closely modelled on the standard false belief 
test which they pass with ease. In particular, the contrast with neurotypical 2-year-olds who 
showed spontaneous looking to the correct location on the same task (Southgate and others, 
2007) is quite notable. It is unlikely that the general lack of motivation is to blame, as all the 
participants in the Asperger group showed correct anticipatory looking in the familiarization 
trials, in which false belief attribution is not necessary. 
The results of this study are consistent with the clinical profile of high-functioning 
individuals with ASD, who show difficulties in social communication in real life despite 
performing fairly well in a well-controlled experimental or training context. It is also 
consistent with the findings that training on false belief tests does not necessarily improve 
social adaptation in ASD (Ozonoff and Miller, 1995): the capacity for false belief attribution 
may not be sufficient to deal with its spontaneous use in a fluid and rapidly changing “real” 
social world. 
Why do individuals with ASD fail to develop spontaneous theory of mind? There are at 
least two possibilities. Firstly, they may have a modular impairment in theory of mind (Leslie, 
Friedman, and German, 2004), and thus have to develop compensatory strategies to infer 
other people’s mental states. Such a compensatory strategy may not be efficient enough to 
infer mental states spontaneously and effortlessly in the fluid and rapidly-changing social 
environment. Secondly, it is possible that socially relevant cues, such another person’s gaze 
direction or emotional expression, do not spontaneously recruit social cognition in ASD. For 
example, a recent study demonstrated that infants at high risk to develop ASD showed a 
slower and less organized cortical response to others’ gaze direction (Elsabbagh and others, 
2009), even though they have no difficulty in spontaneously orienting to another person’s 
eyes (Chawarska and Shic, 2009). Note that these two possibilities are not mutually exclusive 
because an early impairment in processing socially relevant information may lead to an 
atypical development of theory of mind (Senju and Johnson, 2009). Further developmental 
studies will be necessary to understand the developmental trajectory of spontaneous and 




Recent developments in theory of mind research have revealed that young infants 
spontaneously attribute false beliefs to others well before they can pass explicit false belief 
tests. By contrast, high-functioning adults with ASD, who easily pass explicit false belief 
tests, do not show spontaneous false belief attribution. These new findings change our 
understanding of the development of theory of mind both in typical development and in 
individuals with ASD. However, as is often the case with such new findings, it creates more 
questions than answers. 
Firstly, we need to identify the mechanisms underlying spontaneous false belief 
attribution. Note that it is not unnecessary automatic or obligatory. For example, some studies 
(Apperly, Riggs, Simpson, Chiavarino, and Samson, 2006; Lin, Keysar, and Epley, 2010) 
have demonstrated that even in typically developed adults, belief attribution can be easily 
disrupted by task demands. Thus we need to understand how and when the theory of mind is 
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computed spontaneously in real social interaction, what kind of social and/or environmental 
cues prompt such computation, and how it underlies successful social communication. 
Further investigation is also required for the neural substrates of spontaneous theory of mind, 
especially how far it does or does not overlap with the regions related to the processing of 
theory of mind in response to explicit instruction. 
Secondly, we need to revisit the developmental course of theory of mind. Recent studies 
consistently show that infants pass spontaneous false belief tests by about 15-18 months of 
age (Baillargeon and others, 2010). Can younger infants pass the task? If not, is it because of 
the development of theory of mind itself, or due to other task-relevant skills such as working 
memory, oculomotor control and/or motivation? Are there any environmental factors, such as 
the number of older siblings or the mode of parent-infant communication, which would affect 
the development of spontaneous theory of mind? Most of these questions have been asked for 
the development of explicit false belief attribution, but we would have to begin again with 
this new theory of mind test at hand. Another important question is, as I discussed above, to 
investigate why young toddlers fail in explicit false belief test even though they can pass 
spontaneous theory of mind tests.  
Finally, the question remains why adults with ASD in our study show an absence of 
spontaneous false belief attribution, even though they have no difficulties in explicit false 
belief reasoning, and how it relates to their impairment in social communication. For example, 
is there any way we can prompt theory of mind computation in individuals with ASD other 
than explicit verbal instruction? Can we train individuals with ASD to spontaneously 
mind-read? If so, does it change their social adaptation in real life?  
Theory of mind has been a core topic in various fields of science which try to 
understand the biological basis of human social behaviour. Recent updates in theory of mind 
research brought about by the introduction of the spontaneous theory of mind test has 
changed our views about the development of theory of mind, and the nature of its impairment 
in ASD. Future studies on this topic will help us understand how humans process mental 
states in a fluid and rapidly changing social world, how this helps establish successful human 
social communication and its development, and how its impairment relates to difficulties in 
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Figure 1. Predicted probability of passing standard false belief tests by verbal mental age. 
Open square: Individuals with ASD; Closed circle: Typically developing individuals. 
Reproduced, with permission, from (Happé, 1995) 
 
Figure 2. Selected scenes from stimulus movies. In familiarization trials, participants were 
familiarized to an event in which (A) the puppet placed a ball in one of two boxes (B) both 
windows were illuminated and a chime sounded, and (C) an actor reached through the 
window above the box in which the ball was placed, and retrieved the ball. The participants 
were familiarized to the contingency between (B) and (C). In (D), the puppet moves the ball 
while the actor is looking away. This operation induces a false belief in the actor about the 
location of the ball. Reproduced, with permission, from (Senju and others, 2009) 
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Figure 3. (A) Mean (± SEM) difference looking scores (DLS) and (B) the ratio of the number 
of participants who made correct first saccades in each group. DLS is calculated by 
subtracting the looking time for the incorrect window from correct window, and then 
dividing the difference by the total of the looking times in both correct and incorrect windows. 
AS: participants with Asperger Syndrome (N = 19), NT: neurotypical participants (N = 17), 
*: p < .05, **: p < .01, dotted lines: chance level, statistical test used: (A) t-test and (B) 
binominal test. Reproduced, with permission, from (Senju and others, 2009). 
 
